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BOOK REVIEW
The Rehabilitation of Samuel Chase
STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING:
THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS AND THE DIALECTIC OF
FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE. North Carolina: Carolina
Academic Press, 1991. Pp. 272.
STEWART JAY*
Alexander Hamilton wrote in 1778 that a certain member of the
Continental Congress possessed "the peculiar privilege of being
universally despised."' Hamilton's target was Samuel Chase of
Maryland, future Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court. Hamilton accused Chase of abusing his position as a member
of Congress by employing confidential information to reap monopoly
profits from the cornered market in edible grains needed for military
consumption. The attack was bluntly abusive and highly personal.
'The love of money and the love of power are the predominating
ingredients of your mind-cunning the characteristic of your under-
standing." Hamilton predicted: "your avarice will be fatal to your
ambition."2
Hamilton was hardly the first or the last to hold a low opinion
of Chase's character. To put it mildly, the typical judgment of histo-
rians about the man has not been kind. Forrest McDonald called
him "a rogue who exploited public trust,"3 and more than a few have
cast him as a politician whose views fluctuated in step with his
private interests.4 Whatever the truth of these accusations may be,
the salient feature of Chase's life was his capacity to survive such
charges. Notwithstanding Hamilton's prognostication, his denuncia-
tion produced only a momentary setback for Chase. Although Chase
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. Although I have dis-
cussed the book reviewed here with many colleagues, Wythe Holt provided invaluable
suggestions as well as a meticulous reading of my manuscript.
1. Publius Letter, I, N.Y.J. & GEN. ADVERTISER, Oct. 26, 1778, reprinted in 1 THE
PAPERS OFALEXANDER HAInLTON 569 (Harold Syrett ed., 1961).
2. Publius Letter, IMI, N.Y.J. & GEN. ADVERTISER, Nov. 16, 1778, reprinted in 1 THE
PAPERS OFALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 582.
3. FORREST MCDONALD, E PLURPBUS UNIM 90 (1965).
4. See, e.g., NORIAN K. RISJORD, CHESAPEAKE POLITICS 1781-1800, at 279 (1978).
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in fact had engaged in profiteering, he was returned to Congress less
than two years later. Subsequently, the Maryland House of
Delegates concluded that Chase's gains did not result from betrayal
of congressional secrets.5 Chase went on to figure as a leading player
in Maryland legislative politics during the 1780s, when he was regu-
larly at the center of controversies spawned by a "nearly insatiable
appetite for profiteering."6
At the end of the 1780s, Chase joined his colleague Luther
Martin in denouncing the proposed federal Constitution as an in-
strument of "despotism" that would "in its operation and effects
annihilate the State Governments."7 "The supreme and inferior
federal courts will have the same effect by absorbing the state
courts," Chase predicted.8 Yet slightly over a year later, Chase wrote
George Washington to volunteer that he would be "highly gratified"
by an appointment as a Justice of the Supreme Court.9 Influential
friends of Chase also communicated to the administration that he
would accept the position of Attorney General of the United States if
offered.10 Washington ignored these inquiries, and while there is no
recorded evidence, it is fair to surmise that Chase's nomination would
have been opposed by Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton, who had
not been impressed by the House of Delegates' exoneration of Chase.
Undaunted, Chase continued to apply for federal offices, includ-
ing the well-remunerated job of customs collector in Maryland."
Finally, Chase's approaches to Washington through the powerful
Maryland Federalists James McHenry and William Vans Murray
bore fruit. Putting aside what Washington delicately referred to as
the alleged "impurity in his conduct," the President nominated Chase to
fill the position created by the retirement of Justice John Blair."
5. Id. at 75-76. For details on this episode, see JAMES HAW ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT:
THE LIFE OF SAMUEL CHASE 102-19 (1980) [hereinafter HAW ETAL., STORMY PATRIOT].
6. RISJORD, supra note 4, at 75.
7. Samuel Chase, Objections to the Federal Government, Handwritten Notes for
Address to the Maryland Ratifying Convention (Apr. 24, 1788), in James A. Haw, Samuel
Chase's "Objections to the Federal Government," 76 MD. HIST. MAG. 272, 274, 277 (1981)
[hereinafter Haw, Objections].
8. Id. at 278.
9. Letter from Samuel Chase to George Washington (Sept. 3, 1789), quoted in JANE
S. ELSMERE, JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE 38 (1980).
10. See ELSMERE, supra note 9, at 38-39.
11. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (Feb. 26, 1782), in 3 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 2-3.
12. ELSMERE, supra note 9, at 53.
13. See 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, at 108-12 (Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1985) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. The "impurity" comment appeared in a 1795 letter to Hamilton
concerning Chase's suitability as Attorney General. See Letter from George Washington
to Alexander Hamilton (Oct. 29, 1795), in 19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra
274 [Vol. 41
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Washington believed that Chase was "unquestionably, a man of
abilities," for despite his Anti-federalism, "it is said that he has been
a steady friend to the general government since it has been in opera-
tion." 14 Through the intermediation of McHenry, Chase assured
Washington that he "shall never have reason to regret the nomina-
tion."5 Washington probably did not, for following his appointment
in 1796 Chase avoided serious controversy until after Washington's
death in 1799. Thereafter, Chase's conduct in several political trials
and his overt Federalist partisanship led to his becoming the only
Supreme Court Justice to be impeached. Chase survived that epi-
sode too, but his reputation as the "American Jeffreys" persisted.
Until recently, Chase has been remembered mainly for the dubious
distinction of escaping conviction by the Senate despite his abusive
judicial manner, thus strengthening the independence of the
Supreme Court. Jefferson lamented that "impeachment is a farce
which will not be tried again." "
During the last few years, however, something of a Chase re-
vival has been underway, with two full biographies that balance his
image by recognizing the man's considerable talents.'7 In addition,
for more than a decade Stephen Presser has been attempting to es-
tablish Chase's place as a prominent figure in the early federal judi-
ciary.18 Presser's articles recently appeared, with some alterations
and supplemental material, in book form.19
I
Presser is unabashed in his promotion of the "fabulous and
complex Federalist Samuel Chase,"0 whom he asserts "was the most
brilliant of the first justices."2' Presser devotes little effort to reha-
note 1, at 358.
14. Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Oct. 29, 1795), in 19 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 358.
15. Letter from James McHenry to George Washington (Jan. 24, 1796), in 1
DOCUMENTARYHISTORY, supra note 13, at 111.
16. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William B. Giles (Apr. 20, 1807), in 10 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 387 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905).
17. See ELSMERE, supra note 9; HAW ETAL., STORMY PATRIOT, supra note 5.
18. See Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase,
and the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 26 (1978);
Stephen B. Presser & Becky B. Hurley, Saving God's Republic: The Jurisprudence of
Samuel Chase, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 771; see also Stephen B. Presser, The Supra-
Constitution, the Courts, and the Federal Common Law of Crimes, 4 LAW & HIST. REV.
325 (1986).
19. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE
AMERICANS AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE (1991).
20. Id. at 91.
21. Id. at8.
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bilitating Chase's personal manner, which may be beyond redemp-
tion; he acknowledges that Chase was a "difficult,"22 "peculiar"23 and
"stubborn[]" man, with an "apparently distasteful bombastic
style,"' and "a hair-trigger temper."" Yet to Presser, these are
"superficial oddities" 27 that have contributed in no small measure to
later generations' misjudgment of Chase.25
On the positive side, Presser portrays Chase as endowed with
unusual "personal courage." Particularly in comparison to John
Marshall, Chase "flinched from public battle much less."29 But this is
a minor point in comparison to Presser's larger claim that "Chase's
views on constitutional interpretation... were typical" of the pre-
Marshall Court."0 According to Presser, the constitutional interpre-
tation advocated by federal judges in the 1790s "have been neglected
to too great an extent."31 Instead, "Marshall still receive[s] virtually
all the credit for creating an independent and significant federal
judiciary."3 2 Presser considers this as an injustice to Chase and his
colleagues, since "most of the characteristics of the Court's institu-
tional role that Marshall and his colleagues later developed were
initially articulated by the earliest Supreme Court Justices, well
before Marshall's appointment."33 This includes the theory of judicial
review in Marbury,l which Presser suggests may have been directly
borrowed by Marshall from a Chase trial opinion. 5
22. Id. at 25.
23. Id. at 11.
24. Id. at 116.
25. Id. at 179.
26. Id. at 116.
27. Id. at 179.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 176.
30. Id. at 8. See also id. at 178.
31. Id. at7.
32. Id. at 172.
33. Id. at 171.
34. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
35. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 171. Presser is referring to United States v.
Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709), a Sedition Act prosecution in
Richmond, where "John Marshall was in the audience, soaking up the arguments he
would later reproduce in the Marbury case." Id. at 242 n.42. This point is plausible, but
establishing the pedigree of ideas is very difficult. While much of Chase's argument on
judicial review appeared in Marbury, the ideas were a part of the public debate at the
time. As early as Federalist No. 78, Hamilton made many of the key points later found in
Marbury. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961). As Presser himself notes, Justice Paterson "anticipated" Marshall's Marbury
opinion in a circuit opinion in Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012, 1014
(C.C.D. Pa. 1795). PRESSER, supra note 19, at 64. I have pointed out elsewhere that most
of Marbury's substance was rehearsed on the floor of Congress during debates on the re-
peal of the Judiciary Act of 1801. See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part
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Presser does not wish to push Marshall's dependence on his
predecessors' work too far. As the title of the book highlights,
Presser discovers "an original misunderstanding by Marshall and
his followers about the meaning of the American Constitution," in
that they failed to appreciate "the original republican ideals in
America of civic virtue" that underlay the earlier process of constitu-
tional interpretation. 36 The Court under Marshall substituted a
"flexible constitution, tailored to expand the sphere of both federal
legislative action and commercial certainty."37 Marshall's "republi-
can ideal," Presser believes, was based on "acquisitive individual-
ism," the acceptance of which required "the constitutional system of
adjudication to take on the character of an objective market-en-
forcement mechanism," so that the resulting social inequalities
"would seem natural and immutable."38
From this base, it is not hard to uncover Presser's purpose in
writing. For Presser, there is a consistency in the core of Chase's
jurisprudence, *in that it has "moorings in a collectivist republican
ideology of virtue."39 In contrast to the "competitive, atomistic enter-
prise" of Marshall and later Taney, "Chase seems to have hoped for
a more organic community, in which individuals were engaged ulti-
mately not in competitive, but in cooperative, enterprise."0 Chase
was a deeply religious man, and for him the ultimate "purpose of a
republic was to further the individual exercise of religion and moral
service to God."4' Presser hopes "to rekindle among us the fire of the
soul of Samuel Chase,"42 for "perhaps there is still something to be
gained by considering the values of the organic, religious, and ulti-
mately fulfilling controversial jurisprudence of Samuel Chase."4 3
This "resurrecti[on of] a lost conservative jurisprudence"" is all the
more needed, "[niow that the idea of possessive individualism is
more frequently seen to have unacceptable consequences for the
community, now that the plight of insular minorities evokes more
sympathy, now that society struggles more coherently toward a new
organic conception of American republicanism."
4
One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1107 (1985) [hereinafter Jay, Origins 11. I suppose that the
speakers may have been merely parroting Chase, rather than following Hamilton or
Paterson.
36. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 168.
37. Id. at 163.
38. Id. at 179.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 167.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 169.
43. Id. at 168.
44. Id. at 189.
45. Id. at 168.
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At the outset, Presser cautions that this "is not exactly a work
of history nor a work of law nor a work of biography, but something
approaching all three and torn in three directions by its multiple
aims."" He confesses that the product is "a lawyer's understanding"
that is advanced with "an advocaters] ... 'warm zeal.' 47 Presser
ultimately wants his work to be a statement about the present; it is
perhaps for this reason that he falls short of adequately portraying
the past in any of these three ways.
There are scarcely any new facts about Chase in the book, and
the reader seeking a biography will undoubtedly want to consult
other authors' treatment of that subject. 8 For the most part, Presser
reinterprets the available evidence to paint one of the most flatter-
ing portraits of Chase. Even on that score his argument is not espe-
cially convincing.
Presser purports to be concerned not merely with Chase, but
also with his contemporaries. 49 Yet the book offers only a few scraps
of biographical material on the others. Furthermore, despite
Presser's justified admonition "that historians of the early American
legal system cannot rest with conclusions about hermetically sealed
conceptions of the nature of the law,"50 the book is not a comprehen-
sive chronicling of events and personalities as they bear upon adju-
dications by federal judges in the 1790s. For that matter, apart from
presenting a handful of circuit cases and making passing references
to some Supreme Court decisions, Presser does not provide anything
approximating a thorough account of the work or purpose of the
early federal courts.
The book claims to examine the "jurisprudential notions" of
legal and political actors in the 1790s, the derivation of these no-
tions "from complex and competing ideologies, and how... adher-
ence to these ideologies often led [those actors] to take inconsistent
political or legal positions."5 Nevertheless, the bulk of Presser's
evidence pertains solely to Chase, which requires Presser to fulfill
his promise of showing that Chase's views were close to those of the
other federal judges. Not much is accomplished in this regard, ex-
46. Id. at ix.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., ELSMERE, supra note 9; HAW ET AL., STORUY PATRIOT supra note 5;
RISJORD, supra note 4, at 160-96, 278-93, 464-65; Phillip A. Crowl, Anti-Federalism in
Maryland 1787-1788, 4 Wtf. & MARY Q. 446 (1947); Haw, Objections, supra note 7;
Richard B. Lillich, The Chase Impeachment, 4 A. J. LEGAL HIST. 49 (1960); Neil
Strawser, Samuel Chase and the Annapolis Paper War, 57 MD. HIST. MAG. 177 (1962);
Anne Y. Zimmer, The 'Paper War' in Maryland, 1772-73: The Paca-Chase Political
Philosophy Tested, 71 MD. HIST. MAG. 177 (1976).
49. See, e.g., PRESSER, supra note 19, at 45.
50. Id. at 177.
51. Id. at 45.
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cept for unspecific references to general concepts such as social def-
erence, conservatism, religiosity, or an "organic concept of the virtue
of the people."52 A serious drawback of relying on this generalized
terminology is that the words are modern usages with connotations
that do not always capture the spirit, much less the nuances, of
18th-century thought. Their very abstractness obscures the range of
opinions among early Americans.
The book actually does not make clear what Presser believes
comprised the ideological views of the first federal judges. He ap-
pears to identify the federal bench as sharing a common viewpoint
with other prominent Federalists of the period. Presser delineates
"two jurisprudential strains of republicanism in America, a 'conserv-
ative' strain manifested by Federalist judges such as Samuel Chase,
and an 'opposition' or radical strain manifested by Jeffersonian
'Republicans,' [including] Thomas Jefferson himself."53 The "basic
difference in political philosophy"54 between these two camps is
located in issues of social deference and their respective willingness
to trust the judgment of the people. "Chase and his fellow
Federalists,... whatever their differences, believed in a structured
society, the inevitability of different social classes, and the sub-
ordination of the lower orders to the upper."55 By contrast, Jefferso-
nians "managed to convince the public that they had a greater faith
in the wisdom of the people and.., a greater willingness to tolerate
ongoing public participation in government.""
This broad thesis about Federalists and Republicans has been
stated by many other scholars, most recently by Gordon Wood in his
book, The Radicalism of the American Revolution," which explores
the basic forces comprising republicanism that led to the ascent of
democracy in America. Full length studies of the transition from
revolutionary republicanism to the Jeffersonian eclipse of Feder-
alism have the advantage of presenting significant variations among
persons identified with these respective movements. Even such
major figures as Madison and Jefferson, for example, exhibited
considerable differences in their willingness to trust the judgment of
ordinary persons. Larger studies can also relate these developments
to the specific historical events unfolding in American society. These
were remarkable years,.for as Wood has stated, "[p]erhaps no coun-
try in the Western world has ever undergone such massive changes
52. Id. at 184.
53.Id. at7.
54. Id. at 17.
55. Id. at 18.
56. Id. at 17.




in such a short period of time."58
Presser does not ignore the historical context, but neither does
he provide a detailed or systematic rendition of the period that
would add flesh and blood to his highly abstract depiction of the
ideological channels in which these people moved. Presser's abstract
depiction of the ideological similarities among Federalist judges
reads as an uninteresting truism, because, in order to demonstrate
those similarities, he is forced to reduce the assorted Federalist per-
sonalities to a single common denominator and to contrast it with a
similarly reduced opposition. The Federalist judges are painted by
Presser in one hue, as if there were no important variations among
such figures as James Wilson, William Paterson, James Iredell or
John Jay.
Instead of attempting to chronicle the ideological movements of
the 1790s, Presser seeks to demonstrate how federal judges-Chase
in particular-played out their roles as adherents of the conserva-
tive version of republicanism. Fair enough for one book, but again
the author narrows his portrayal principally to one man, and then
he discusses only some of the more controversial aspects of Chase's
life. Left largely untouched is Chase's life as a Maryland politician
and state judge. Likewise, Presser passes over the great bulk of
Chase's Supreme Court cases, to say nothing of his work on circuit.
For the most part, these lower court cases must be painstakingly
recovered from original court records and manuscript files, and
Presser has accomplished little of this work. By contrast, Julius
Goebel's history of the Supreme Court before 1801 is vastly richer in
detail, albeit replete with mistakes and devoid of any critical effort
to relate the Justices' activities to the politics and ideological cur-
rents of the day.59
In fact, a comprehensive treatment of the early federal courts
that accounts for the effect of ideology on adjudication has yet to be
written. Richard Buel's book, Securing the Revolution,0 for example,
is a significant effort along these lines, yet he does not undertake a
thorough investigation of the early federal courts. Wythe Holt has
made a fine start in this direction with a detailed article stressing
that "the national court system was there in large part because state
courts could not be trusted to handle creditors' suits against debt-
58. Id. at 232.
59. JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971). There are local studies that add consider-
ably to our knowledge of particular circuits, such as Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau's definitive
work on the federal courts in Kentucky. MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN
THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY 1789-1816 (1978).




ors."61 Through meticulous research, Holt demonstrates how the
Framers of Article ]]I 62 and the 1789 Judiciary Act6 fashioned the
federal judiciary to fulfill what they saw as the central task of re-
storing credit to the debt-ridden American economy. Considering
Holt's account, it is puzzling why Presser does not take up Chase's
actions in debt cases, particularly his important decision in Ware v.
Hylton," which upheld a claim based on a pre-revolutionary debt
owed to a British creditor. Ware was decided four days after
Washington declared the Jay Treaty" to be in effect. A primary
purpose of the treaty was to resolve the longstanding conflict with
the British over American debts. The decision in Ware contributed
significantly to the administration's efforts, and ought to be at least
worth mentioning in a book focusing on the political elements influ-
encing federal judges."
Presser's book is at its best when he turns from ideological la-
bels to specific themes. The chapter on federal common law crimes is
especially well done, and he amply establishes that not only did
virtually all the Supreme Court Justices of the time agree with the
concept, but they also had solid legal grounds for doing so.
Answering critics, Presser effectively shows that those who either
deny the legitimacy of the early federal common law rulings or seek
to limit their scope have rested their cases on elaborate theories
unknown to the late 18th century." The core of his argument is that
federal common law crimes were grounded on a "supraconstitu-
tional" theory, namely the right of national "self-defense" recognized
under the law of nations."
61. Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice".• Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1518.
62. U.S. CONST. art. Ill.
63. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.c.
§ 1652 (1988)).
64. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 220-45 (1796).
65. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (Jay Treaty), Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat.
116.
66. See GOEBEL, supra note 59, at 748-49.
67. Compare PRESSER supra note 19, at 88-89 with Robert Palmer, The Federal
Common Law of Crimes, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 267 (1986). Undoubtedly my judgment is in-
fluenced by the fact that Presser and I agree on this subject. See Jay, Origins I, supra
note 35; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231
(1985) [hereinafter Jay, Origins Il].
68. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 89. Here Presser could have provided a more
elaborate explanation of how choice of law principles of that era supported common law
criminal jurisdiction without violating either the Constitution or Section 34 of the 1789
Judiciary Act. See Jay, Origins II, supra note 67 at 1254-90.
1993]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Presser's remarks on: federal common law crimes become less
persuasive when he tries to relate the issue to one of his major
themes, that Federalist judges were acting "quite in keeping with
English conservatism." 9 This is rather more obscuring than helpful,
for among other things it does not explain why Jefferson or Edmund
Randolph initially adhered to the Federalist view on federal common
law crimes.Y' The answer is that they did so as members of George
Washington's cabinet, at a time when the administration considered
it critical to national security for the federal judiciary to punish
neutrality violators. As no statute was available, the prosecution
had to proceed under the common law.' Jefferson and his followers
cooled to the notion of nonstatutory federal crimes only later when
the prosecutorial targets were Republican newspaper writers, and
Jefferson became convinced that the promulgation of a federal com-
mon law of crimes was part of a Federalist plot to absorb the states
into a consolidated, monarchical government.72
Undeniably, the judges were relying on English legal tradi-
tions, as that was the principal jurisprudence they knew, and the
same could be said of almost any American jurist of the period.
Creating common law offenses by federal judicial action, however,
presented a complexity that no English judge confronted, namely
the scope of a national common law in a system of federated states.
It is difficult for Presser to explain Chase, who was the sole
federal judge of the 1790s known to have rejected federal common
law crimes. Chase's view was expressed in United States v.
Worrall,73 a 1798 nonstatutory prosecution for attempted bribery of
a federal official. Chase insisted that the federal government could
exercise only powers "expressly granted" by the Constitution.
Regarding a common law jurisdiction in criminal cases, Chase was
adamant that "the United States did not bring it with them from
England; the constitution does not create it; and no act of Congress
has assumed it."74 The common law of England had been selectively
received in the various states, and thus Chase demanded to know:
"[Wihat is the common law to which we are referred? Is it the com-
mon law entire, as it exists in England; or modified, as it exists in
some of the states; and of the various modifications, which we are to
select... ?"7- Disagreeing with Chase, District Judge Richard Peters
stated the orthodox Federalist position that a conviction could be
69. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 94.
70. See Jay, Origins I, supra note 35 at 1044-45, 1048.
71. See id. at 1042-49.
72. See id. at 1089-93.
73. 28 F. Cas. 774 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766).




upheld on the basis of the government's sovereign "power to pre-
serve itself.""6 According to the lore about this case, after articulat-
ing their differences, Chase and Peters recessed the proceeding and
consulted with the other Justices, who were then in Philadelphia.
Returning to court, they agreed to convict the defendant and sen-
tenced him to fine and imprisonment.
If Chase continued to dissent from his fellow Federalists on this
point, there is no record of it, and as Presser notes, he went on to try
other federal common law criminal cases without apparent protest.
Presser is probably on target in suggesting that Chase's "complete
reversal"" was prompted by admonitions from "his new Federalist
friends that the political necessities of the time required a federal
common law jurisdiction." 8 Yet Presser is not satisfied with this
conventional wisdom, and goes on to claim that the federal common
law episode demonstrates that Chase's legal philosophy was under-
going a fundamental change. Just as the Federalist position on
common law crimes was "quite in keeping with English conserva-
tism,"'9 Chase "may have been transformed... to an adherent of
transplanted English conservative jurisprudential thought."8 This
assertion needs careful proof. A plausible alternative explanation is
that Chase was simply fulfilling his promise to Washington by fol-
lowing the views of the other federal judges. To assess Presser's
claim, Chase's career must be considered in more detail.
I
This "transformation" theory is one of the central statements of
Presser's book. As a young man, Chase had been a leader of the
Maryland Sons of Liberty and he had signed the Declaration of
Independence as a delegate to the Continental Congress.
Throughout the Revolution, Chase played a significant, if secondary,
role in promoting the cause. For electoral success in Maryland poli-
tics, Chase depended on a base of tradesmen and mechanics, and his
Anti-federalist sentiments featured a vehement attack on aristoc-
racy. Presser characterizes this period in Chase's life as his "more
democratic"8' phase, which he likens to the "'country' theorists of
England. 82
76. Id. at 779-80. Justice Chase and Judge Peters were the only judges hearing the
case. Id. at 774.
77. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 95.
78.Id. at 96.
79. Id. at 94.
80. Id. at 95.
81. I& at 24.
82. Id. at 149.
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According to Presser, after spending a year in England (1783-
84), Chase became enamored with English society, and "for the rest
of his professional life, Chase sought to implement some British
deferential notions, particularly in his judicial activities."83 Presser
submits that Chase's experience in England, along with the "natural
development" of aging, led the former, fiery states' rights man to the
-Federalist cause.' At some point in the late 1790s, Chase became "a
champion of Burkean and Hobbesian ideas, believing in the neces-
sity for a strong central authority to check the inevitable tendencies
in America (or in any popular republic) toward anarchy and chaos.""
Presser terms this an "English-inspired movement to the right,"
with Chase "embrac[ing] a political program much closer to that of
the English ministry of the 1790s. "18
Without question, the Federalists' view of the need for central-
ized government separated them from Republicans, and in fact their
position had an affinity with that of the contemporary English court.
Yet in the scheme of the Hamiltonian wing of Federalists, the issue
of common law crimes was but a footnote. Hamilton admired the
unprecedented commercial and military state accomplished by the
British, and he wished to emulate it in America through a financial
plan bearing marked similarities to English practices. 7 In the
Hamiltonian system, a strong executive would lead the legislature;
it was this feature, J.G.A. Pocock has written, that struck
Jeffersonians "as pursuing the tradition of the Junto Whigs, Walpole
and George HI, which had contributed so powerfully to the belief
that Britain was irredeemably corrupt."8 Hamilton's program re-
quired restoring national credit and producing a dependable inter-
national commerce to fund his various ventures, including a
stronger military establishment. Stable relations with Great Britain
were essential to this plan, and hence the negotiations for the Jay
Treaty were critical. Most Federalists readily endorsed Hamilton's
goals and methods, but to Jefferson and his followers the treaty was
a surrender of national honor and proof positive of the Federalists'
ambition to replace the republic with a monarchyf 0
83. Id. at 24.
84. Id. at 27.
85. Id. at 37.
86. Id. at 149.
87. See GERALD STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN
GOVERNMENT 98 (1970); WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 57, at 412 n.37.
88. J.G.A. PococK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 528 (1975). See LANCE BANNING,
THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION 176-78 (1978).
89. See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42
VAND. L. REV. 819, 839-41 (1989).
90. See DONALD H. STEWART, THE OPPOSITION PRESS OF THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 177-
235 (1969).
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The fingerprints of the federal judiciary could be seen-if one
were so inclined-all over the implementation of the Federalist plan.
The judges vigorously enforced the neutrality laws, provided a forum
for debt collection (especially to pre-war British creditors), imple-
mented the revenue laws (not only in prosecuting revenue violators,
but also most prominently in dealing firmly with the Whiskey
Rebellion), and suppressed dissenters, not to mention serving both
as ministers overseas (the Jay Treaty) and as political agents at
home through grand jury charges sympathetic to the Federalist
cause. Whether this was a coordinated effort by the judges remains
to be proven, notwithstanding the strong circumstantial evidence. In
the broadest sense, Presser is justified in pointing to evidence
adduced by other scholars to show the Federalist judges were
running a parallel course with their English counterparts. 91 English
judges of that period "were frequently the foci of political expression
and political conflict."92
Nevertheless, neither the Federalists nor their judges intended
to introduce the English political system, with its extensive system
of patronage, multiple places, and aristocratic privileges. The judges'
reliance on English authorities was natural given their training in
the English tradition. Furthermore, in England, the colonies, and
the new American states, "[oifficials and institutions could not easily
be compartmented into tidy groups labelled administrative and judi-
cial, or public and private.9 3 Not only were judges frequently in charge
of administering ordinary government ftmnctions, but they were
involved as well in the formulation and execution of official policies.9 5
91. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 143.
92. Id (quoting John Brewer, The Wilkites and the Law 1763-74, in AN
UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE 128, 133 (John Brewer & John Styles eds., 1980)).
93. W. J. JONES, POLITIcs AND THE BENCH 17 (1971); John Brewer, The Wilkites and
the Law, 1763-74, in AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE 128, 133 (John Brewer & John Styles
eds., 1980).
94. On the administrative function of colonial judges, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDAIAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 50-51 (2d ed. 1985); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 154 (1969) [hereinafter WOOD, CREATION]. In English
government, a prime example of officials with multifaceted roles was the local Justices of
the Peace, who in the eighteenth century had wide ranging and often unreviewable
authority over rural and urban governmental administration. The Justices tried minor
criminal and civil actions and acted as magistrates in preparing more serious criminal
cases for assize trials. See JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 143-44 (1960); 1
SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FROM THE REVOLUTION TO
THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT 533-50 (1906); J. STEPHEN WATSON, THE REIGN OF
KING GEORGE III, 1760-1815, at 42-47 (1960); BASIL WILLIAMS, THE WHIG SUPREMACY
1714-1760, at 49-51 (1939). The principal English judges also exercised supervisory pow-
ers over local administrative officials. See 10 SIR WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 155-56, 243-56 (1938).
95. In addition to playing a key role in administering local colonial government,
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The most likely explanation for the support that federal judges
of the 1790s gave to the Washington and Adams administrations lies
in the personal background of these individuals. Gordon Wood
points out that "[o]f the twenty-eight men who sat on the federal
district courts in the 1790s only eight had held high judicial office in
their states; but nearly all of them had been prominent political
figures, having served in notable state offices and in the Continental
Congress."96 Washington's appointments to the bench were com-
prised of individuals whose sympathy to the Federalist viewpoint he
knew from personal experience or by the vouching of trusted confi-
dants. Chase was out of this mold; he had come to the Supreme
Court from being the Chief Justice of Maryland's most important
court, with a prior career centered in state legislative politics. In
mulling over the possibility of appointing Chase to the Court,
Washington noted that Chase had proven to be a strong supporter of
the government despite his earlier Anti-federalism.97 Chase aptly fit
Wood's description of the Federalist judges: "They saw their service
on the court as simply an extension of their general political activ-
ity ... "
IV
A rival of Chase called him a "[s]trange inconsistent man,"99
and Presser may have done the best possible job of imposing some
degree of ideological order on the man's life. In doing so, however,
Presser lays himself open to the same charge that he justifiably
brings against others. That is, the consistency may be entirely the
judges in the colonies were often members of the governor's council, which acted as both
the upper body of the legislature and as an advisor to the governor in his executive
capacity. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 94, at 46, 50; LEONARD W. LABAREE, ROYAL
GOVERNMENT INAMERICA 134-35, 407-08 (1930); WOOD, CREATION, supra note 94, at 159-
60. British judges served on major commissions that investigated controversies and rec-
ommended courses of action. See Alfred F. Havighurst, The Judiciary and Politics in the
Reign of Charles II, 66 LAW Q. REv. 62, 66 (1950); BRIAN ABEL-SMITH & ROBERT STEVENS,
LAWYERS AND THE COURTS 9 (1967); 4 SIR WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 68-69, 69 n.1 (3d ed. 1945). While on assize assignments, the British judges
"were expected to report upon men and matters of interest, to use their influence in sup-
port of official policy, and to intervene when necessary." JONES, supra note 93, at 19. See
also 1 SIR WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 272-73 (7th ed. 1956); 2
EDWARD R. TURNER, THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND
EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 1603-1784, at 14445 (1928).
96. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 57, at 324.
97. See supra text accompanying note 14. Washington also had the assurance of
James McHenry that Chase was a safe appointment. See supra note 15, and accompany-
ing text.
98. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 57, at 324.
99. Letter from Alexander Contee Hanson to Unknown Recipient (July 25, 1790),
quoted in HAW ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 2.
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product of superimposing an ideological progression on Chase's life
that neither he nor his contemporaries would have understood.
The ordering apparent in Chase's life does not fall along ideo-
logical lines-it is rather nearer to Hamilton's depiction than to
Presser's. Chase was a man almost ruthlessly driven by personal
ambition, which in turn reflected a lifelong sense of social inferiority
to the landed gentry. As even his somewhat sympathetic biogra-
phers conclude, Chase always felt slighted by the Maryland elite,
and his principal escape from that indignity was to accumulate
property.100 The other route was political power, which was not unre-
lated to the first.
Certainly there are aspects of Chase's service in the legislature
and during the Revolution that deserve honor, but the continuous
abuse of those positions to advance his personal fortune are difficult
to put aside. Not only did Chase corner the grain market, but he was
also instrumental in the passage of Maryland's laws for confiscating
loyalist property, in which Chase then speculated with abandon.
Constantly in debt as a result of various investment schemes, Chase
backed a series of legislative initiatives to relieve debtors, himself
included. Most notably, this involved extending the time for repay-
ment of state obligations, allowing debts to the state to be repaid
with depreciated paper money, and issuing new paper money to re-
lieve the shortage of money needed for meeting payments. 1 1 Most of
Chase's proposals failed, and by the time he became an Anti-federal-
ist, Chase was also bankrupt, eventually requiring relief from the
state legislature to avoid his creditors.
"Chase was a man of the people, or at least of the petty bour-
geoisie, °0 writes Presser, and "when young, seems to have em-
braced democracy as an ultimate principle, and to have borrowed,
temporarily, a Wilkite or Paineite fervor for emancipation from
corrupt aristocratic leadership in late colonial Maryland."03 While
Chase was not high-born, a different picture of his political outlook
emerges once the record is scrutinized. In his youth, he was influen-
tial in writing the 1776 Maryland Constitution, which Presser
thinks was "fraught with checks and balances. 0 4 In reality, it was
perhaps the most conservative state constitution of the era, and the
checks and balances promoted by Chase were designed to entrench
the power of the small elite that controlled Maryland politics-the
100. See HAWETAL., STORY PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 7-8; 13-14.
101. See id. at 130-43; MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 91-99; RISJORD, supra note 4, at
166-74.
102. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 180.
103. Id. at 182.
104. Id. at 22.
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very group that Chase had relentlessly sought to join.' Among
other things, the Maryland Constitution provided for steep property
qualifications for election to the legislature, governorship and gov-
ernor's council, in addition to property requirements for voters. 0 6
Other state constitutions featured weak executives, but Maryland's
gave the Governor and Council important administrative and ap-
pointment powers. 07 Chase was not entirely satisfied with the prod-
uct, for he wanted a still more aristocratic document, with lengthier
terms for Senators and members of the House of Delegates. 08
It is true that the youthful Chase encouraged popular anti-
proprietary agitation and was peerless in Maryland for his promo-
tion of the Revolution. Similarly, his electoral successes depended on
the loyalty of ordinary people. Nevertheless, all of this is consistent
with the demagoguery characteristic of this period, when even
members of the gentry were not above encouraging unrest and riot-
ing by the masses. 09 Whether one agrees entirely with Forrest
McDonald in saying that Chase "artfully duped the people, led them
by demagoguery into destructive ways, and exploited them without
mercy,""10 the evidence is consistent with that interpretation.
Presser himself concedes that as a state legislator Chase "proved
that a politician demagogically playing for the multitudes could
launch the most outrageous schemes for private profit at public ex-
pense.""' Chase's revolutionary actions themselves may be tainted:
105. See ELSMERE, supra note 9, at 18; HAW ETAL., STORMY PATRIOT, supra note 5, at
74-75; Crowl, supra note 48, at 450, 464-65.
106. See M.D. CONST. of 1776, § II (£500 real or personal property for House dele-
gates), § XV (£1000 for Senators); § XXVI (£1000 for congressional delegates), § XXX
(£5000 for Governor); § XLII (£1000 for county sheriffs), § XLII (voters must own freehold
of 50 acres of land in county where they vote or possess £30), § XIV, XV (indirect election
of Senators by electors, who must own £1000), § XXVI (five man Council to Governor se-
lected by House and Senate; councilors must own £1000), in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS
OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 376-83 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975).
107. See id. at § XXXIII (Governor, with advice and consent of Council, has
"executive powers" to grant reprieves, lay embargoes and quarantines), § XLII (Governor
appoints Register of Wills on recommendation of Senate & House), § XLVII (Governor
and Council appoint judges, attorney general, military officers, and most civil officers of
government), § XI (Senators to be "at full and perfect liberty to exercise their judgment in
passing laws," i.e., they are not bound by constituents' instructions). In addition, judges
held office during good behavior, subject to removal by Governor and two-thirds vote of
each House. See Declaration of Rights, § XXX, reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 106, at 324.
108. See HAW ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 75-76. The Constitution
provided for a five-year term for Senators and one year for Delegates; Chase wanted to
add two years to each. Id.
109. See PAUL A. GILJE, THE ROAD To MOBOCRACY 44 (1987); GARY B. NASH, THE
URBAN CRUCIBLE 143 n.56 (1979); WOOD, RADICALISM supra note 57, at 90-91.
110. MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 91.
111. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 22.
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The ultimate result of the revolution was the removal of the elite
that dominated Maryland's colonial government-the clique from
which Chase had been excluded by his limited fortune and lack of
social connections. His objection was never to elite governance.
Rather Chase rebelled at basing entrance to the elite's ranks upon
class distinctions instead of the merit shown by acquiring prop-
erty."
2
As an Anti-federalist, Chase espoused a democratic, states'
rights position. The reason for this stance could not have been, as
Presser hypothesizes, that Chase was acting out of "sensitivity to
Maryland popular opinion.""' Not only was the state generally sup-
portive of the proposed federal Constitution, but Chase's Baltimore
legislative district (which he had moved to shortly before ratifica-
tion) was strongly Federalist."4 Prior to the ratifying convention,
Chase stayed out of the public Anti-federalist campaign. On practi-
cally the eve of the election, Chase's name appeared as a candidate
from his former legislative district in Annapolis, which he was no
longer qualified to represent.1 5 His oration at the convention failed
to convince the great majority, but his Anti-federalism cost him
reelection to the House of Delegates. Indeed, he never returned to
the House of Delegates, unless one counts his obtaining bankruptcy
protection by special legislation in 1789.116
Chase's Anti-federalism may leave the impression that for once,
at least, the man took a principled stand. His detractors, however,
maintained with considerable justification that Chase was mainly
motivated by his opposition to the paper money ban in the
Constitution, and by the expected loss of his own political influence
to national authority."17 Chase, after all, was a leader of the
Maryland pro-paper money forces, and he had achieved considerable
prominence and power in his little world."' Edmund Randolph was
not alone in saying at the Philadelphia Convention that the "most
likely" opposition to the Constitution would come from "local dema-
gogues who will be degraded by it from the importance they now
hold. These will spare no efforts to impede that progress in the popu-
lar mind which will be necessary to the adoption of the plan.""'
Chase corresponded precisely to this depiction. Moreover, his rapid
112. See HAW ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 24.
113. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 23.
114. See HAW ETAL., STORMY PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 49.
115. Id at 149.
116. See id. at 156, 158-59.
117. Id. at 148; Crowl, supra note 48, at 460-69.
118. See Crowl, supra note 48, at 452-53, 461.
119. Edmund Randolph, Address at the Constitutional Convention (July 23, 1787), in
2 THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 89 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
1993] 289
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
conversion to Federalism reflects more than a bit of malleability in
his constitutional perspective.
For Presser, however, Chase's sudden love for Federalism was
a "natural development" caused by "contact with England, and by
aging."20 Yet Chase had visited England some four to five years
prior to his conversion to Federalism. Perhaps he had "been dazzled
.by what he saw," 2' and spoke "in raptures"122 about the virtues of a
country in which social deference was a preeminent characteristic,
but one wonders why the lesson only struck him years later-after
his passionate avowal of Anti-federalism. Maturity may very well
dampen a person's fire, but only a year elapsed before Chase sought
federal office. The only apparent change for Chase during this time
was the sharp decline in his political and financial fortunes.
Before receiving his seat on the Supreme Court, Chase held
simultaneous appointments for about five years as a judge on two
Maryland courts (Chief Judge of the General Court, Maryland's
premier court, and Chief Justice of the Baltimore criminal court,
Oyer and Terminer). The second appointment was widely under-
stood as providing a supplement to Chase's inadequate salary on the
General Court. While this arrangement did not sit well with many
in Baltimore who resented supporting a statewide office, the issue
did not produce a serious protest until 1794. It was then that Chase
became involved in the vigorous prosecution of pro-French rioters at
Fell's Point, near Baltimore. Chase denied bail for the key leaders of
the mob, which produced an uproar from the assembled crowd and
threats to Chase's person and home. At one point it appeared that
lawful government virtually had been suspended. These episodes
occurred at about the time of the Whiskey Rebellion, and combined
with the fact that some of the rioters were members of the pro-
French Republican Society of Baltimore, Chase was convinced that
government was being subverted.'2
To Chase's chagrin, the grand jury not only refused to indict
the rioters, it proceeded to rebuke the judge for abuse of power in
the proceeding and for his allegedly unconstitutional act of holding
two offices at once. Chase retorted indignantly that the grand jury
was not competent to determine constitutional questions, nor should
they "presume to censure the Conduct of [their] Superiors." A The
matter did not die, for that Fall a resolution was brought in the
120. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 27.
121. Id. at 47.
122. Id. at 24 (quoting HAW ETAL., STOIMY PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 125).
123. See ELSMERE, supra note 9, at 45-51; HAW ET AL., STORIY PATRIOT, supra note
5, at 167-74.
124. Statement of Chase, J. to the Baltimore County Grand Jury, August 1794,
quoted in HAW ETAL., STORMIY PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 174.
290 [Vol. 41
SAMUEL CHASE
House of Delegates demanding Chase's removal from the General
Court. Although the motion failed, the legislature terminated
Chase's dual offices by abolishing the Court of Oyer and Terminer. It
was during the period of the Fells Point affair that Chase ap-
proached Washington about securing the financially valuable posi-
tion as port collector of Baltimore.IS
A major motivation for Chase's pursuit of federal employ-
ment-of any kind-was to obtain a comfortable source of income to
support himself and his large family. Both Chase and his backers
made this plain in letters to Washington. 6 Some have argued that
Chase's conversion to Federalism was occasioned by his dismay at
the lawlessness of the Fells Point riots and the events of the
Whiskey Rebellion. 27 However, Chase first applied for a Supreme
Court appointment in 1789, telling Washington then that he would
"support the present government. "1IS It should also be remembered
that Chase never complained about mobs when they served his
cause.
V
The pattern running through Chase's life is by now evident.
Chase took advantage of most every office he held before his
Supreme Court service to line his pockets through deeds that were
not necessarily in the public interest. Beyond this, he pushed each
position to maximize his own political power. Chase had consider-
able company in this respect, as many politicians in later 18th-cen-
tury America saw no conflict with employing their offices for per-
sonal gain (financial and otherwise). What distinguished Chase was
his excess, so much so that as Washington observed, he was
"violently opposed in his own State." 29 Chase also found himself
caught in the midst of a growing revulsion on the part of the public
over politicians who regarded their offices as a form of personal
property.
130
Commonly Chase's tactics went beyond mere aggressiveness to
what can only be called bullying. Subtlety was not this man's style.
125. See HAW ET AL., STOIMIY PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 174-75.
126. See id. at 166.
127. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 108.
128. Letter from Samuel Chase to George Washington (Sept. 3, 1789), quoted in HAW
ETAL., STORMY PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 166.
129. Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Oct. 29, 1795), re-
printed in 19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAILTON supra note 1, at 358.
130. Jefferson made this a theme of his movement, as he railed against "the
shameless corruption of a portion of the representatives to the 1st. & 2d. Congresses and
their implicit devotion to the treasury." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund
Randolph (Feb. 3, 1794), in 8 THE WORKS OF THOIAS JEFFERSON, supra note 16, at 138.
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When confronted by opponents, Chase often lashed back in the most
highly personal way. In one broadside that he penned to answer a
challenge which could be construed as a slight on his social position,
Chase blared: "I can treat with Contempt the FAT PIMP, and give
him sneer for sneer."'3 ' Unguarded impulse frequently made him his
own worst enemy, as when he proclaimed before losing his last elec-
•tion to the House of Delegates, that if he had realized during the
Revolution that it would lead to the federal Constitution, "he would
have been the greatest Tory in all America."32
Chase's willingness to engage in personal invective against his
perceived enemies is especially interesting in light of his role in the
period 1799-1803 as the scourge of Republican writers who had pub-
lished remarks that were scarcely distinguishable from his own ear-
lier products. The difference, of course, was that Chase's government
and his personal ally John Adams were now on the receiving end.
Several chapters in Presser's book are devoted to important inci-
dents involving Chase during the crisis period of the Adams admini-
stration from 1799 to 1801. Most of these were federal criminal
prosecutions: the treason trial of John Fries, and several actions
under the Sedition Act to punish criticism of the Adams administra-
tion. The remainder involved Chase's overt campaigning for Adams
in the 1800 election and his use of grand jury charges for partisan
statements. The basic facts of these cases have been set out by other
writers, and Presser does not add many new details, but his inter-
pretation of the evidence at times varies considerably from the usual
accounts.
Presser's primary point is that Chase was not acting very dif-
ferently from other federal judges. Chase was not alone in vigorously
enforcing the Sedition Act, nor was he the first federal judge to find
that resistance to lawful authority constituted treason. Further-
more, a number of his controversial rulings were well justified on
the basis of English precedent. As to partisanship, Chase was in
good company among federal judges, who often spiced grand jury
charges with political statements. Kathryn Preyer has pointed out
that circuit court grand jury charges by Supreme Court Justices
after 1798 "became more specifically political rather than general,
more emphatic in their warnings of danger to the new republic from
abroad and from enemies within."33
Presser is on the right track in thinking that Chase had become
131. HAW ET AL, STORIY PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 24 (quoting Samuel Chase, To the
Publick, July 18, 1766.
132. Samuel Chase, quoted in HAWET AL., STORMYPATRIOT, supra note 5, at 156.
133. Kathryn Preyer, United States v. Callender: Judge and Jury in a Republican
Society, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at
173, 178 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992).
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"a convenient symbol for all the failings of the Federalists,"-" and
that to a large extent the singling out of Chase for impeachment was
politically motivated. Undoubtedly Chase's widespread unpopular-
ity, his tendency to excess, and his abusive personality explain why
he made such a tempting target. Granting these points, there re-
mains a series of troubling aspects to these cases that dampen any
sympathy one might have for Chase.
John Fries had been charged with treason for leading an armed
band to release a tax protester from prison.3 5 Chase presided at
Fries' second trial, his first conviction having been overturned be-
cause of the alleged prejudice of a juror.136 After reviewing the record
from the first trial, in which defense counsel argued extensively over
the definition of treason, Chase decided on his own motion before
the second trial started to distribute a memorandum outlining his
views of the law. 37 Presser acknowledges that this is the only re-
corded example in early American law of a judge's restricting coun-
sel in advance of trial without affording them a chance to argue. 8'
Fries' lawyers-two prominent Republicans-refused to proceed,
even after Chase "withdrew" his opinion, since Chase's ruling gutted
their defense.'39 Chase then announced that he would serve as Fries'
counsel, a move that Presser correctly notes was common in English
practice.4'4 Fries was convicted and sentenced to death.'4 '
In his sentencing speech, Chase went on at length about a citi-
zen's obligation to affect political change only through the electoral
process. The judge lamented that both the Whiskey Rebellion and
Fries' insurrection had cost the government dearly, and conse-
quently would necessitate new taxation or borrowing.4 3 At the end
of this statement he included a few remarks that had the tone of a
sermon, the burden of which was that Fries should prepare to meet
his Maker by repenting of his sins, and that the traitor would be
well advised to "converse and commune with ministers of the gospel"
before hanging.' Presser merges the two parts of the address by
contending that Chase saw a "close linkage between fidelity to God's
law and those of man,"145 and that "Chase's religion was the princi-
134. PRESSER, supra nofe 19, at 5.
135. See id. at 104.
136. Id. at 108.
137. Id. at 109.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 112.
140. Id. at 112-13.
141. Id. at 114.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 117-18.
144. Id. at 115.
145. Id. at 117.
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pal guiding force in his life and in his politics." 146 In addition,
Presser comments that Fries "bore him no malice,"47 that he "must
have felt the real compassion of the 'American Jeffreys.""' The main
support for his assumption about Fries' benevolent feelings toward
Chase is an unsubstantiated story from an 1827 biography.
According to this account, Fries travelled to Baltimore to thank
Chase for conducting a fair trial. Presser allows that "[tihis event
may be apocryphal."
From all of this, Presser believes that "Chase may have per-
suaded Fries that their political ideals were ultimately the same."10
Perhaps so, but it is equally plausible that Presser is making a
string of unwarranted assumptions, particularly in concluding that
Chase was "sincere" in his "sympathy"15" ' for Fries. As to the relig-
ious basis of Chase's jurisprudence, it is Presser who makes the ex-
plicit linkage, not Chase. The religious admonitions to Fries read
much more like standard instructions to a condemned man than the
articulation of a theologically based political theory.
The point about the influence of religion on Chase's decision
making may seem to be something of a quibble, but Presser exhibits
a bothersome tendency to make assumptions about individual moti-
vations, especially those centering on Chase's religiosity. Later in
the book Presser states the bolder thesis that religious convictions
were "the deepest underlying cause of his behavior," so much so that
Chase excused his "monstrously self-serving pecuniary adventures"
as "the wishes of a benevolent and omnipotent God.""5 2 Bear in mind
that the evidence for this conclusion is circumstantial, resting
mainly on the fact that Chase was a religious man. Other judges of
this period were deeply religious as well-John Jay comes to mind-
but there is scant evidence that the particular decisions of any of
these men were religiously inspired. In any event, if Presser's claim
about Chase is correct, one is left to wonder why the author finds
anything positive in the "religious, and ultimately fulfilling" juris-
prudence of Chase.
53
Fries was saved from execution by President Adams' pardon. In
contrast to Chase's "real compassion, " 5 4 Presser finds that the par-
don was "a demagogic gesture" by "the beleaguered and popularity-
146. Id. at 116.
147. Id. at 114.
148. Id. at 116.
149. Id. at 114.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 116.
152. Id. at 181.
153. Id. at 168.
154. Id. at 116.
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craving John Adams." 55 There is no documentation to justify this
reproach, and in actuality the reprieve was politically costly to
Adams, as it widened the split between him and the Hamiltonian
wing of the Federalist party.56 Popular reaction may have been on
Adams' mind, but he was nonetheless concerned about the potential
for abuse inherent in defining treason to include mere resistance to
law enforcement: "Is there not great danger in establishing such a
construction of treason as may be applied to every sudden, ignorant,
inconsiderable heat among a part of the people wrought up by politi-
cal dispute?
" 157
Chase achieved lasting infamy from the Sedition Act cases he
tried. 5 8 From one perspective, the evil of these sedition prosecutions
should not be laid on the judges, who were simply enforcing a stat-
ute. Consider, however, that prior to the Act federal judges had been
willing to entertain federal common law criminal prosecutions for
seditious libel. 59 In several ways, the Sedition Act appeared on pa-
per to be a liberalization of the common law, such as by allowing
truth as a defense. Put in practice, these reforms may have been
inconsequential. Most significantly, the defense of truth was gutted
by Chase's ruling that the defendant had the burden of proving
"truth beyond a marrow."6"
Abandoning conventional wisdom about the Sedition Act,
Presser contends that the prosecutions have been blown out of pro-
portion, especially when compared to political trials in England and
Europe at the time.161 The relevance of this point is not evident,
inasmuch as America was organized around the republican ideal of
popular consent. What seems a "feeble effort" to Presser6 2 did not
appear as such to Republican newspapers forced to discontinue be-
cause of Federalist harassment.'3 Nor was it a light matter when
Chase sentenced a man in Boston to 18 months' imprisonment for
erecting a liberty pole with the motto including the words, "Downfall
to the Tyrants of America."'6 On the other hand, it is true that the
155. Id. at 112.
156. See 2 PAGE SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 1033-34 (1963) [hereinafter SMITH, JOHN
ADAMS].
157. 2 id. at 1033 (quoting John Adams).
158. See United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 642 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865);
United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 252 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709).
159. See BANNING, supra note 88, at 256-57 (1978); GOEBEL, supra note 59, at 629,
632-33; JAMES M. SMITH, FREEDOI'S FETTERS 188-220, 385-90 (1956) [hereinafter SMITH,
FREEDOM'S FETTERS].
160. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 643 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865).
161. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 119.
162. Id.
163. See BANNING, supra note 88, at 256-57.
164. See JOHN C. M=ILER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM 114-20 (1951); SMIrH, FREEDOM'S
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Act had only a minor net effect oh the opposition press and actually
served to galvanize the Republicans in their resistance. 6 5
Of the some fifteen Sedition Act cases tried by federal judges,
Presser reports only two in detail, both of which involved Chase.1 16
Essentially Presser finds that Chase's rulings were sound under
"solid English conservative doctrines,"167 and in this respect his re-
view of the cases follows that of Julius Goebel.168 Part of the reason
that Chase's decisions went over poorly with the populace at the
time was the inappositeness of the English precedents to the
American scene. For example, in the most notorious trial, United
States v. Callender,169 Chase refused to allow a Richmond jury to
determine whether the Sedition Act was constitutional.70 Presser
quotes Coke's dictate that in England only judges were qualified to
declare the law.'7 ' However, American practice had long departed
from the English in this respect: colonial as well as American juries
had been accustomed to the privilege of independently determining
the law. 72 In other cases, federal judges-Chase included-generally
followed the procedure of allowing the jury to determine the law,
which Presser notes. 73 On the question of a jury determining the
unconstitutionality of legislation, English law was irrelevant-
indeed obnoxious-since the courts there regarded acts of
Parliament as supreme.
Presser's explanation for the disagreement over the jury func-
tion is that it was all a misunderstanding over what "law" meant.
According to this view, Chase intended the jury merely to find the
"law" in the sense of applying the law to facts of the case.
Republicans, by contrast, took law finding to mean the broader func-
tion of ascertaining the meaning and applicability of precedents. 7 4
This is an insight, he says, that "seems to have escaped virtually all
the historians of the Federalist period."175 To prove his argument,
Presser relies on the Fries case, where Chase refused to allow coun-
sel to argue "improper or irrelevant authorities." On its face, this
does not show Chase entirely denying the jury a pure law-finding
function. For one thing, the competing lawyers might cite different
FETTERS, supra note 159, at 257-68.
165. See BANNING, supra note 88, at 257-58.
166. See supra note 158.
167. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 138.
168. See GOEBEL, supra note 59, at 635-51.
169. 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14, 709).
170. Id. at 252-58.
171. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 138.
172. See SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMEICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW 48-66 (1990).
173. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 65-66, 110.
174. Id. at 18, 44, 111.
175. Id. at 18.
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lines of potentially relevant authorities, and there is no indication
that Chase would have prevented counsel from attempting to per-
suade the jury as to the correct interpretation. More importantly, in
trials with panels of several judges, juries might receive differing
instructions from the various judges.
Chase's behavior in restricting counsel in Fries is better under-
stood as the product of his determination not to allow counsel to
parade a series of old English treason cases before the jury. As
Presser notes, Fries' counsel were attempting to discredit the use of
a definition of treason based on English law by showing examples of
its abuse under that system. Chase did not assert that the jury was
disabled from finding the law, but rather that as the judge he had
some control over the introduction of irrelevant material. Putting
aside the obvious political collision this produced, one explanation
for the impasse could be that the federal judiciary was entirely com-
posed of formally trained judges, a feature that was unusual in
America." 6 Chase's ruling, then, may have reflected the view of a
new professional class of judges who thought that they were entitled
to control their trials to a greater degree than previously.
Chase's refusal to allow the Callender jury to consider the con-
stitutionality of the Sedition Act was of a different order. Presser
ventures that Chase did not "understand the culture" in Virginia,
where juries had long acted "as a sort of buffer between the royal
government and the powerful planters."'" It is hard to imagine that
Chase, a Marylander with astute legal and political insights, was
not aware that his views on the jury would engender resentment. All
knowledgeable Americans would have known that there was a tradi-
tion in their country of juries limiting the force of law by appealing
to natural rights, as the famous Zenger 78 case had showed. Further-
more, the matter of jury discretion was very much a hot issue.
Richard Ellis has shown that at about this time there was agitation
in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts against the Federalist doctrine
limiting the jury's law finding function. 79 This was part of a broader
movement that was critical of lawyers and what complainants called
"lawyers law," which one writer referred to as "those absurd rules of
evidence, pleadings, and everything which has changed simple
justice into a professional mystery, which has contributed to the
oppression and plunder, rather than the happiness of the people."80
176. STIMSON, supra note 172, at 58.
177. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 139.
178. The Trial of Mr. John Peter Zenger (1735), 17 Howelrs St. Trials 675 (1816).
179. See RICHARD E. ELIJS, THE JEFFERSONLN CRISIS 176-78, 190-91, 197-98, 201-03
(1971).
180. JESSE HIGGINS, SAJIPSON AGAINST THE PHILISTINES, OR THE REFORMATION OF
LAwSuITs; AND JUSTICE MADE CHEAP, SPEEDY, AND BROUGHT HOME TO EVERY MAN'S
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Chase's arguments in Fries and these sedition cases were vul-
nerable to precisely such objections. Regardless of their technical
accuracy under English procedure-the point which Presser
stresses-Chase's rulings appeared to impose arbitrary limits on
what had previously been a much simpler, jury-dominated process.
Worse, they were imposed by judges who seemed to be driven by a
mean-spirited desire to insure the result desired by the Federalist
administration. Chase himself went out of his way to encourage
indictments by recommending that grand juries look carefully at
certain publications or by suggesting that there were seditious writ-
ings circulating in the community.'' And though it was not uncom-
mon for judges to advise juries of their views on the merits, Chase
vituperated against defendants, as when he denounced Thomas
Cooper's publication as "the boldest attempt I have known to poison
the minds of the people."'82 It is no wonder that the impeachment
charges against Chase not only attacked the legal correctness of
several decisions that limited the jury function, but also excoriated
him for his zealous impartiality. Referring to the Callender trial,
Chase was impeached for "the use of unusual, rude, and contemptu-
ous expressions towards the prisoner's counsel," and for manifesting
"an indecent solicitude.., for the conviction of the accused."' 3 The
Senate voted 18 to 16 to convict on this article, short of the required
two-thirds margin. T8
A final feature of the Callender episode-which Presser men-
tions only in passing-is the relation between Chase's insistence on
controlling the question of constitutionality and the Virginia
Resolutions of 1798.'1 Not only were the resolutions a rebuke of the
Sedition Act, but they also strongly implied that the states had the
right to make their own determinations about the constitutionality
of federal legislation-a claim made explicitly in Jefferson's
DOOR; AGREEABLY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ANCIENT TRIAL BY JURY, BEFORE THE SAME
WAS INNOVATED BY JUDGES AND LAWYERS 16 (2d ed. 1805), quoted in ELLIS, supra note
179, at 177 n.12.
181. See ELSMERE, supra note 9, at 117, 126-27.
182. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 642 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865)
(petit jury charge).
183. 1 TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE 5-8 (Samuel H. Smith & Thomas Lloyd eds., 1805),
reprinted in LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 230 (Stephen B. Presser &
Jamil S. Zainaldin eds., 1989).
184. LAWAND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 183, at 247.
185. See Virginia Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 554 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 1836) (declaring the Constitution a compact under which "the states... are in
duty bound, to interpose, for arresting the progress" of "deliberate, palpable, and
dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by said compact").
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Kentucky Resolutions of 1798.186 Chase's withholding of the question
of the Sedition Act's constitutionality from the jury was a direct
Federalist assault on Virginia's dominant Republican constitutional
theory. The central thrust of Chase's Callender opinion is not the
jury trial question, but rather a sustained defense of Federalist
centralizing-the claim of exclusive federal judicial review of the
constitutionality of legislation.187
For Presser, Chase's jury restrictions reflected his "organic,
Christian, conservative jurisprudence... influenced probably by the
example of contemporary England and by what he saw happening in
Pennsylvania and Virginia."" Moreover, Presser thinks that this
represented a change in Chase's attitude-he was "newly con-
verted... in the Fries and Callender cases" to "the deferential,
essentially English, conservative jurisprudence."'89 It is clear that
Chase shared the general paranoia of Federalists who saw a con-
spiratorial connection among the Whiskey Rebellion, Fries
Rebellion, the excesses of the Republican press, the rise of Thomas
Jefferson, and the French Revolution. 90 But this does not mean that
Chase had suddenly changed his mind, or 'move[d] to the right"
under English influence, as Presser claims.' 91 If the English experi-
ence was so decisive for Chase, why did fifteen years pass before it
took hold? In a footnote, Presser offers that Chase was "in close
touch with English thought,"92 but no proof is given as to the extent
or nature of this contact.
The much simpler explanation, one that is consistent with
Chase's career and personality, is that his conduct in Fries and the
sedition trials was merely the latest manifestation of basic tenden-
cies. During the revolutionary period, for example, Chase was with-
out peer in Maryland for insisting on severe measures against loyal-
ists and neutrals, including property confiscations and loyalty
oaths.193 In these formative years he honed the technique of accusing
186. The Kentucky Resolutions declared that the Constitution was a compact, and
that "each party has an equal right to judge for itself" the terms of the agreement, as well
as "the mode and measure of redress" for infractions of them. Kentucky Resolutions of
1798 and 1799, reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 185, at 566.
187. See Preyer, supra note 133, at 185-87.
188. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 185.
189. Id. at 94.
190. See generally BUEL, supra note 60 (providing a comprehensive discussion of
Federalist attitudes).
191. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 149.
192. Id. at 207 n.31.
193. See HAW ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 96. Chase also sponsored
criminal measures "for a variety of offenses from treason, sedition, and corresponding
with the enemy to discouraging enlistments, acknowledging any dependence on England,
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opponents of treason. When Charles Carroll of Carrollton objected to
Chase's loyalty oath program, Chase denounced him (in an anony-
mous newspaper article) for becoming "the advocate of the disaf-
fected, tories, and refugees." 1' Chase saw Tories lurking every-
where, including in the government, as when he warned that there
were "flaming patriots" who "pretended love of country, and resent-
ment to Great Britain... when their real view was to obtain trust,
office and power under the government." 95
Throughout his career Chase treated opponents harshly and in
a fiery manner. The same man who hounded adversaries in
Maryland politics also put down the Fells Point rioters as a judge,
telling the grand jurors that they had no right to comment on consti-
tutional questions. He was the same man who enforced the
Federalist order of the late 1790s without brooking a contrary view
from anyone, much less jurors. His attitude about the people never
changed from what he wrote in a letter of 1778: "The Conduct of the
populace and of popular Assemblies is much oftener dictated by
passion and prejudice than by Wisdom. Whim, Humour or Caprice
frequently influence their determination."' In a telling conclusion
to this note, Chase added: "With these Sentiments why do you think
I love Noise and Politicks?"'
9 7
VI
Following his election to the presidency, Jefferson took no im-
mediate action against the federal judges who had enforced the
Sedition Act. Instead, he pardoned those convicted and ceased pend-
ing prosecutions. With regard to the federal judiciary as a whole, his
major assault was to seek repeal of the 1801 Judiciary Act, which
had substantially enlarged the size and the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts. 98 Jefferson's relatively moderate course changed, how-
ever, when he read a grand jury charge that Chase delivered in
Baltimore in 1803. Chase's declaration to the jury had been re-
printed in a Baltimore newspaper, and it exhibited a passion that
rivalled the tone of his old Anti-federalist rhetoric. From the bench,
Chase railed against the repeal of the Judiciary Act, as well as at
trying to depreciate the currency, and spreading false news injurious to the cause." Id.
194. Mn. GAZETTE (Annapolis), Aug. 23, 1781, quoted in HAW ET AL., STORMY
PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 110.
195. MD. GAZETTE (Annapolis), June 21, 1781, quoted in HAW ET AL., STORMY
PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 110.
196. Letter from Samuel Chase to Stephen West (Oct. 16, 1778), quoted in HAW ET
AL., STORY PATRIOT, supra note 5 at 100-01.
197. Id. at 101.




constitutional changes in Maryland that altered the court system
and instituted universal manhood suffrage. These judiciary reform
measures, Chase lamented, would "take away all security for prop-
erty and personal liberty. The independence of the national judiciary
is already shaken to its foundation, and the virtue of the people
alone can restore it. The independence of the judges of this state will
be entirely destroyed" by restructuring the Maryland court sys-
tem. 99
The most revealing part of the charge concerned Maryland's
abolition of property requirements for voting. Chase was convinced
that this would "certainly and rapidly destroy all protection to prop-
erty, and all security to personal liberty; and our republican consti-
tution will sink into a mobocracy, the worst of all possible govern-
ments."200 Reminding his audience of "the great and patriotic charac-
ters by whom your state constitution was framed," Chase noted the
irony in the fact that "the sons of some of these characters have
united to pull down the beautiful fabric of wisdom and republican-
ism that their fathers erected!"
l 2 1
This was not the only irony present, for Chase perceptively
observed that the movement for universal suffrage was propelled by
the forces unleashed from the very revolution he had so zealously
championed:
The declarations respecting the natural rights of man, which originated
from the claim of the British parliament to make laws to bind America in
all cases whatsoever; the publications since that period, of visionary and
theoretical writers, asserting that men in a state of society, are entitled to
exercise rights which they possessed in a state of nature; and the modem
doctrine by our late reformers, that all men in a state of society, are enti-
tled to enjoy equal liberty and equal rights, have brought this mighty mis-
chief upon us; and I fear that it will rapidly progress, until peace and or-
der, freedom and property shall be destroyed. 0 2
Presser reads this passage as showing "how far [Chase] had
come from the days when he was a firebrand," for Chase now under-
stood that "democracy was a young person's game."2 03 But Chase was
never a democrat. In proclaiming that liberty and property were
insecure when laws were "made by representatives chosen by elec-
tors, who have no property in, a common interest with, or attach-
199. Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Maryland (May 2, 1803), reprinted
in LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 183, at 224.
200. Id. at 224.
201. Id. at 224-25.
202. Id. at 225.
203. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 144.
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ment to the community,"204 Chase was repeating the philosophy that
inspired him in producing the. original Maryland Constitution.
Chase could agree that the people were the necessary instrument for
rebellion, and that civil government was formed by their joining
together as "member[s] of a community, which gives the protection
of the whole to every individual."2 °5 Yet ordinary people were to defer
to their betters and take care in criticizing their leaders. This was
an injunction that Chase obviously did not apply to himself, for he
had spent much of his adulthood practicing the opposite.
The grand jury charge is the bitter lament of a man whose de-
clining health promised a brief future of gout-ridden discomfort
spent observing his enemies implement a form of government he
despised, but for which he was in no small part responsible. Presser
appears to be making a somewhat similar point in the last chapter,
although the prose is such that this may be a misinterpretation:
[T]he ultimate irony of Chase's judicial philosophy, which sought to im-
plement an 'Old Republican' ideology of an organic deferential state, is
that it somehow appears to have carried within itself carcinogenic cells
that led to its own demise. Chase wanted to save what he believed to be a
republican form of government sanctified by God, but he acted in a man-
ner that resulted in the abandonment of most of the premises he thought
worth living or dying for.206
To the extent Presser means that Chase's judicial manner in
enforcing the emergency regime of the late Adams administration
contributed to Jefferson's ultimate electoral success, he is on safe
ground. Chase's insistence that a republican government could not
exist in an atmosphere of public criticism was a fatal flaw in his
thinking. Beyond that, Presser's message is clouded by the ambigu-
ity of his term "organic deferential state." Alternately described as
"collectivist" or "nonindividualistic," 2 7 it invokes a modern connota-
tion of personal sacrifice for the common good. Presser's emphasis is
somewhat different, for he says that the "popular base"20 1 to Chase's
theory was manifested in the "extreme views"20 9 he presented in the
sedition trials: "[I]n a government based on popular sovereignty, to
libel the government was to libel the people themselves, and [was]
therefore intolerable."210 As Chase told a jury in a sedition case: a
204. Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Maryland (May 2, 1803), reprinted
in LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE INAMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 183, at 225.
205. Id. at 225.
206. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 188.
207. Id. at 179.
208. Id. at 13.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 14.
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person "saps the foundation of the government" by "attempt[ing] to
destroy the confidence of the people in their officers."211 Rather than
calling this an "organic" conception of civic responsibility, one could
easily substitute labels such as authoritarian or intolerant.
Presser's depiction of Chase's theory as being based on "civic
republicanism," "public virtue," or "organic" principles conveys a
much more positive impression than the man's views deserve. Of
course there were many revolutionaries who spoke of self-sacrifice
for the community good.22 Chase was quick to mention his own per-
sonal sacrifices, often in the context of defending himself against
charges of corruption. In an anonymous newspaper article he wrote
in 1781 to rebut the war profiteering charges, Chase described him-
self in the third person: "He devoted his youth, gave up his profes-
sion, and greatly injured his private fortune, for the public serv-
jce."213 Chase's chief sacrifice, it turned out, was erecting a financial
house of cards by going into debt to buy excessive amounts of loyal-
ists' property at bargain rates. Regardless of his noble-sounding
theories about the virtuous citizen, Chase far more resembled what
Presser depicts as his antithesis, the one who pursues "individual
gain at the expense of community solidarity."
2 14
VII-
When Jefferson read Chase's Baltimore grand jury charge, he
took one of his many impetuous steps. Writing to Representative
Joseph Nicholson, a leading Republican in the House, Jefferson
inquired rhetorically: "Ought the seditious and official attack in the
principles of our Constitution and of a State to go unpunished?""'
This may seem an odd inquiry from one who would write the next
year that the Sedition Act was "a nullity as absolute and as palpable
as if Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden im-
age."216 In truth, Jefferson was hardly a libertarian on free speech
issues, as Leonard Levy has demonstrated, for he accepted the pre-
vailing attitude that criminal actions could be brought against those
whose opinions brought government into disrepute. 17 Jefferson's
211. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 639 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865)
(petit jury charge).
212. See WOO, RADICALISM supra note 57, at 65-70.
213. MD. GAZETTE (Annapolis), June 21, 1781, quoted in HAW ET AL., STORMY
PATRIOT, supra note 5, at 114.
214. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 175.
215. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph H. Nicholson (May 13, 1803), quoted in
ELLIS, supra note 179, at 80.
216. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (July 22, 1804), in THE ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS 275 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1987).
217. See LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 46
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objections to the Sedition Act Were mainly aimed at denying that the
federal government had power under the Constitution to bring sedi-
tion actions. 18 Jefferson's career showed his remarkable ability to
shed prior principles for the sake of pragmatic advantage. In the
1790s Jefferson was an outspoken foe of the centralized national
government he saw in the Federalists.' plan, yet as President he was
-willing to exercise more power than either Washington or Adams. 19
Criticizing a Jefferson or a Chase for ideological inconsistency
or, alternatively, finding a coherent evolution in their thinking, is an
all too easy and ultimately uninteresting endeavor. A point worth
remembering is Wythe Holt's conclusion that regardless of whether
the key political actors of this period were "brilliant theorizers,"
their work was driven "by the practical politics of the moment."
220
We are far better informed by explanations that relate why people
behaved to the events within which they were living.
This is not to say that historical studies should neglect ideol-
ogy. Rather, it is a caution to be wary when placing more stock in
ideology than the historical figures themselves did. When ascribing
grand theories to the past, much less when grand theories are used
to explain the past, there is a risk of confusing history with our own
agendas. For example, Presser finds some use in calling Jefferson a
"radical"221 for such stances as his criticism of an independent judi-
ciary, or the famous remark that he "would have seen half the earth
desolated" to assure freedom. From the standpoint of one who had
seen judicial abuses throughout his lifetime, the former is not im-
moderate, and only seems so from a modern vantage point. As to
desolating the earth, or his similar comment that every generation
needs a revolution (cited by Presser),2" one needs to keep in mind
Jefferson's tendency to express romantic political sentiments that he
never implemented. Taken from the standpoint of a man who lived
in a world still dominated by monarchy, Jefferson's rumination does
not merit Presser's comparison to "the attitude of the American
troops in south Vietnam, who piously destroyed villages in order to
'save' them from the Viet Cong.' 24
Presser describes his work as the story of "what appeared to the
American public of 1800 as a broken promise, the promise of popular
sovereignty under the administrations of Washington and
(1963).
218. See id. at 56.
219. See BANNING, supra note 88, at 280.
220. Holt, supra note 61, at 1519.
221. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 152, 155.





Adams."1 Further, he claims to recount an "original misunder-
standing" by the Marshall Court generation, a crucial failure to
appreciate the "republican ideals" of "civic virtue" in the Framers'
Constitution. 8 These ideals were supposedly embodied in Samuel
Chase's rhetoric. Instead, the Marshall court put into place a
"flexible constitution" for the greater glory of commercial expan-
sion.
227
There was no such promise, unless one is concatenated from
the vague statements of the original Federalists about founding
government on the consent of the governed. Alexander Hamilton
may have written in Federalist No. 78 that "the power of the people
is superior"22 to both the judiciary and the legislature, but he was
no friend of popular rule. To use the language of that time, the
Framers created a thoroughly "aristocratic" constitution: the central
premise was that national governance should be in the hands of a
select portion of the population.229 When it came to the judiciary,
unelected, life-tenured judges were to be the pragmatic enforcers of
societal stability, with their first mission the stabilizing of credit
through enforcement of major debts. All of this was apparent for
anyone to see, and the Anti-federalists hardly missed what was
happening.
Whether the early Federalists rejected a "flexible" constitution,
and instead "erect[ed] a structure which only the amendment proc-
ess could alter,"2 ° is a question that turns largely on the meaning of
flexibility. Moreover, it depends on which Federalists one is consult-
ing. Presser refers to Hamilton's statement in Federalist No. 78 that
judges must exercise "judgment," and not "substitute their own
pleasure" when interpreting constitutional provisions.2s' John
Marshall said much the same thing in Marbury, when he declaimed
on the Court's obligation to follow the "original and supreme will" of
the people, lest the Constitution be altered "by ordinary means." 2
Like Marshall, Hamilton saw donsiderable flexibility in the
Constitution when it came to interpreting Congress' powers expan-
sively in order to enact his financial program. Hamilton was also
225. Id. at 3.
226. Id. at 168.
227. Id. at 163.
228. THE FEDERALIsT No. 78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
229. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY ANDTHE LIMITs OF AMERICAN
CONsTrrUTIoNALIsM 154-58, 166-69, 179-81, 200-02 (1990); WOOD, CREATION, supra note
94, at 506-18.
230. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 167.
231. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
232.5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176, 177 (1803).
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second to none in promoting -a tendentiously expansive view of ex-
ecutive prerogatives.
On the other hand, if Madison were consulted on proper consti-
tutional interpretation, the answer would resemble the instrument
that Presser depicts Marshall as rejecting. After all, Madison did
assure the public in Federalist No. 45 that "[tihe powers delegated
-by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few
and defined."23 Nevertheless, Madison had no confidence in
"parchment barriers" to restrain power.' For Madison, the solution
to the usual failings of republics lay [in the extent and proper
structure of the Union."25
Madison's constitution was designed at once to discourage na-
tional legislation and to block the states from enacting the most
pernicious measures-those that threatened property with "improp-
er or wicked projects," such as "a rage for paper money, for an
abolition of debts, [or] for an equal division of property."26 The
"chosen body of citizens"2 7 heading this government were unlikely to
engage in these excesses, which Madison saw as epitomizing the
1780s. Confining national politicians to their respective constitu-
tional roles was likewise not so much a matter of sticking to as-
signed tasks as it was giving each branch the power to resist the
others: "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."' 5 Applying
this theory to the judiciary, Madison quoted Montesquieu's dictate
that judges should not be joined with either the executive or legisla-
tive parts of government. 239
As the 1790s unfolded, Madison and his friend Jefferson be-
came convinced that both the executive and Congress were exercis-
ing power beyond what the Constitution allowed. That the Federal-
ists took a contrary position, with the result that the country split
into two major political parties, speaks volumes about the lack of an
original understanding about the nature of the Constitution. Put
another way, there may have been understanding, but it depended
on whom you asked, and when you asked them. In rejecting rigid
confines for Congress, the Marshall Court was faithful to one of the
earlier traditions. Rather than discarding adherence to popular sov-
ereignty, Marshall plausibly claimed to be acting to further the
people's will: "The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their
identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents
233. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
234. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 333 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
235. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 62.
238. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
239. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 326 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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possess at elections, are, in this... the sole restraints on which they
have relied, to secure them from its abuse.""0
The further historians study the federal judges of the 1790s,
the plainer it becomes that there was more similarity than differ-
ence between their outlook and that of the next generation. Presser
himself admonishes us to give the 1790s jurists their due for laying
the foundation for the Marshall Court's work. Whether the early
judges would have accepted the capitalist world of the next century
is impossible to determine, but unquestionably the Federalists of the
1790s were adherents of commercial prosperity and believed the
national government should play a significant part in its accom-
plishment. Had they been required to decide-to take a case-
whether Thomas Gibbons could run his steamships to New York,
there is every reason to think that most would have given the same
answer as Marshall did in Gibbons.
We are urged by Presser to conclude that Marshall's goal was to
promote "an expansionist, individualist economy" by "protecting
individualistic rights such as those of property and contract,""' and
that this differed sharply from Chase's "organic community" in
which enterprise was "cooperative" rather than "competitive."12 But
Chase was a relentless albeit inept speculator, and his celebrated
opinion in Calder v. Bull2" recognizing a person's natural property
rights was every bit as individualistic as John Marshall's and
William Johnson's dogmatic defenses of the same in Fletcher v.
Peck.2" Unquestionably there was a basic transition underway in
American society during the 1790s with the emergence of a more
entrepreneurial and individualistic form of capitalism. While a case
can be made that judges both adapted to and assisted this transfor-
mation, it is artificial to isolate Chase and Marshall as dichotomous
representatives of pivotal change.
Presser is terribly bothered that Marshall has been applauded
for separating "law" from "politics," 45 because Marshall "hypocriti-
cally masked the inevitable connection of the law with politics" by
marking off an arena of "political questions." This has the suspicious
ring of a complaint by one from another age who sees only a single
possibility: Marshall surely must have known that judicial action
was a species of politics, and hence his statements could only be
hypocritical. Yet another possibility is that Marshall was not using
"political question" in the sense that Presser understands it.
240. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
241. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 178-79.
242. Id- at 167.
243.3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
244. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-39 (Marshall, C.J.), 143-45 (Johnson, J.) (1810).
245. PRESSER, supra note 19, at 177-79.
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Marshall did not deny that -his Court was exercising political power
when it made decisions that .affected the lives of people. His
statement in Marbury appears to be an inchoate attempt to
articulate the idea that there were limits to a court's ability to make
public policy. Perhaps his effort in Marbury, McCulloch,?6 Gibbons,
and other cases to provide a political theory to explain his view was
inadequate or incomplete, but that hardly makes him a hypocrite. 247
If motives are what one wants to find, a better place to search is
the world in which Marshall lived, instead, of one's own. Marshall's
actions demonstrate that he saw the perils of the sort of outright
partisanship practiced by his predecessors. He was perfectly willing
to assign Congress the "political" responsibility of setting the scope
of the commerce power in McCulloch and Gibbons, as that accorded
with the needs of the national state he was helping to create. It
seems unlikely that Chase would have differed, for as Presser dem-
onstrates, Chase stated throughout his Supreme Court career that
legislation was the responsibility of Congress, and that "the task of
judges was simply to follow what the legislature laid down."2
Samuel Chase may have been braver than his Chief Justice in com-
bating enemies, but Marshall deserves his fame for picking the
fights he could win.
246. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
247. Presser asks why "does Marshall still receive virtually all the credit for creating
an independent and significant federal judiciary?" He answers that scholars have
neglected the pre-Marshall Court accomplishments because of a
need to use John Marshall's supposed greatness to legitimize United States
Supreme Court actions since the 'Constitutional Revolution' of 1937.... It
seems more than coincidental that at about the time the courts were frustrating
implementation of New Deal legislation, scholars began lavishly to praise John
Marshall for his famous decisions.
PRESSER, supra note 19, at 172. This is an astonishing statement, and not merely because
it mistakenly assumes that Marshall had no reputation for greatness before the 1930s.
Not a shred of evidence directly supports Pressers proposition. The more logical
explanation for crediting Marshall is that it was not until his tenure that the great cases
associated with national expansion were decided. To be sure, one can trace the origins of
many of these doctrines to the 1790s, but the failure to do so hardly proves Presser's
conclusion. The more likely explanation is simple lack of research (for example, it was not
until the late 1980s that the Supreme Court's Documentary History Project commenced
publishing the principal documents of the early Court).
248. Id. at 43.
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